Evaluating search and matching models using experimental data by unknown
Lise et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2015) 4:16 
DOI 10.1186/s40172-015-0031-7
ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access
Evaluating search and matching models
using experimental data




University of Michigan, 611 Tappan
Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220,
USA
5NBER, Cambridge, USA
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article
Abstract
This paper introduces an innovative test of search and matching models using the
exogenous variation available in experimental data. We take an off-the-shelf search
model and calibrate it to data on the control group from a randomized social
experiment. We then simulate a program group from a randomized experiment within
the model. As a measure of the performance of the model, we compare the outcomes
of the program groups from the model and from the randomized experiment. We
illustrate our methodology using the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), a social
experiment providing a time-limited earnings supplement for Income Assistance
recipients who obtain full-time employment within a 12-month period. We find two
features of the model are consistent with the experimental results: endogenous search
intensity and exogenous job destruction. We find mixed evidence in support of the
assumption of fixed hours of labor supply. Finally, we find a constant job destruction
rate is not consistent with the experimental data in this context.
JEL Classification: J2; I38; J6
Keywords: Policy experiments; Search and matching; Self-sufficiency project; Social
experiments
1 Introduction
Search andmatchingmodels in the spirit ofMcCall (1970) or Diamond (1982),Mortensen
(1982) and Pissarides (1985) (DMP) are an important tool for the evaluation of new or
existing labor market policies.1 The policy experiments conducted within such models
allow consideration of the potential effects of policy reforms that have yet to be imple-
mented in reality as well as the general equilibrium effects of large-scale reforms or of
small-scale reforms that may be implemented on a large-scale in the future. They also
allow what one might call theoretically structured mediation (or decomposition) analy-
sis, wherein the model aids in empirically sorting out the causal channels underlying the
“black box” impact estimates that emerge from design-based studies. Despite the impor-
tance of this policy evaluation tool, it is difficult to put a high degree of confidence in the
quantitative results of such exercises, as it is often difficult to judge how well the model
captures the responses of individuals to changes in government policy.2
In general, the literature evaluates the performance of structural economicmodels, such
as those in the search and matching literature, in two ways. The most common way con-
siders the in-sample fit of the model relative to the moments used in the calibration or
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estimation. In many cases, the ability of the model to match moments not included in the
calibration or estimation process, but drawn from the same empirical context, is also used
as a test of the model.3 This sort of test represents an important starting point to ensure
the benchmark model can replicate behavior observed in the data used to calibrate or
estimate it. However, such tests provide no direct evidence on how reliable the model pre-
dictions are under changes to the policy environment. The second way to gauge a model’s
performance is out-of-sample tests, where the fit to other time periods (or other empirical
contexts more generally) is used as a test of the model. This is a more demanding mea-
sure of performance, as the model’s predictions are compared to an environment outside
of the calibration or estimation process. However, because many features of the economy
vary over time, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which the comparison between out-of-
sample statistics and the model predictions are contaminated by changes in factors not
captured by the model.4
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we introduce a new and convincing
test of the quantitative performance of search and matching models. The new test that
we consider exploits the wealth of information available through social experiments (and
readily generalizes to the broader set of compelling non-experimental impact analyses).
In social experiments, small subsets of the population are randomly assigned to program
and control groups; the program group is subjected to a potential policy reform, and the
difference in outcomes between the groups provides an estimate of themean impact of the
policy.5 Social experiments provide compelling causal estimates of how individuals within
the experiment respond to the incentives introduced by the policy reform. It is in this
sense that social experiments provide an excellent opportunity to determine whether a
particular model, once calibrated or estimated, can accurately predict the effects of policy
changes.6
The basic idea behind our approach is the following: First, we calibrate our model of
interest to match the behavior of the control group from a randomized experiment. Sec-
ond, we introduce the policy of interest in the model and use the calibrated model to
simulate a program group. Third, we compare the outcomes of the model program group
with the outcomes of the experimental program group. The model is asked to match the
outcomes of the program group without relying on the exogenous variation introduced
within the experiment. Further, as in the model, the only change in the economic envi-
ronment that is introduced in the experiment is the policy change of interest. Therefore,
we obtain a test of the model uncontaminated by changes in other factors that could blur
the comparison between the model and the data. In this respect, the social experiment
provides a very rigorous test of the model.7
The second contribution of our paper is to determine whether the model is an appro-
priate tool to use in estimating the behavioral response of the Canadian Self-Sufficiency
Project, a small-scale experiment designed to provide incentives for individuals on
Income Assistance (IA), the Canadian welfare program, to leave the system and seek
employment.8 We use the experimental data on single mothers from the SSP to assess a
textbook model of the labor market, as in, e.g., Pissarides (2000) or the recent survey by
Rogerson et al. (2006). The SSP provides financial incentives by offering temporary earn-
ings supplements to individuals on IA. Individuals must remain on IA twelve months to
become eligible for earnings supplements; once they do, they receive a supplement if they
become employed and leave Income Assistance within the following twelve months. The
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model is augmented to incorporate the main features of the SSP. In particular, the model
allows for time limits in determining eligibility for receipt of the supplement, consistent
with the one-year time limit in the experiment, allows individuals to receive the earnings
supplement for up to three years while employed, and allows the earnings supplement
to depend on the earnings received by eligible recipients. The time limitations for entry
to and exit from the Canadian unemployment insurance program (called Employment
Insurance or EI) and the interactions between IA, the unemployment program, and the
labor market are also incorporated in the model.
The main margin through which the SSP is designed to affect behavior is via increased
job search effort by welfare recipients resulting from the time limitations and the financial
incentives introduced by the program. Therefore, as in Pissarides (2000, Ch.5), we also
introduce endogenous search intensity in themodel. Because of the policy focus on search
effort we do not include a reservation wage channel in the model. Our paper focuses
on testing the partial equilibrium implications of the model, as the SSP is a small-scale
experiment that is unlikely to have general equilibrium implications for the labor market.
After constructing the model, we calibrate the model in the absence of the program
using publicly available, non-experimental data on single mothers and data on the exper-
imental control group. The SSP was implemented separately in two provinces, New
Brunswick and British Columbia, and we calibrate and test the model separately for
each province. The parameters calibrated in the first stage include the discount fac-
tor, search friction parameters, and exogenous job separation rates: parameters that
are, in theory, invariant to changes in the Income Assistance program. We then simu-
late the SSP experiment within our calibrated model and compare the model outcomes
for the simulated control group, the simulated program group, and the difference
between them (i.e., the simulated experimental impact) to those in the experimental
data.
Our tests focus on three features of the model: search intensity, job destruction, and
earnings. First, we consider how well the model specification for search intensity matches
the experimental data. The parameters governing the choice of search intensity cannot
be directly identified in the data and are therefore the margin that we have the least
confidence in. We test the search intensity features of the model by comparing the exit
rates from IA for the control and program groups in the model to those in the data. In
British Columbia, we find that the impacts of the SSP on the IA-to-work transition rates
during the 53 months following random assignment in the model are not statistically dif-
ferent from those in the experimental data. We are also able to match the delayed-exit
effects of a second randomized experiment in British Columbia that offered SSP to new
Income Assistance recipients. Along these dimensions, our model test provides strong
support for the framework. In contrast, the model predicts a significantly (and substan-
tially) higher transition rate from IA to employment with the introduction of the SSP
in New Brunswick. The elasticity of search costs with respect to search effort in New
Brunswick must be much higher than that in British Columbia to match the experimental
impact of the SSP.
The second feature of the model we consider is the constant, exogenous job destruction
rate. The model test produces two findings. First, we find that the data do not reject an
exogenous job destruction rate for the program and control groups in either province, as
there are no statistically significant differences in the employment survival rates for the
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program and control groups, even when individuals in the program group stop receiving
supplement payments. However, the assumption of a constant job destruction rate is not
consistent with the experimental data, as the employment exit hazard rate clearly falls
with tenure.
We also assess the effects of the policy change on earnings. In partial equilibrium, we
expect no change in earnings, conditional on tenure, due to the small number of individ-
uals affected by the policy change in the experiment. For British Columbia, this appears
consistent with the data as the earnings-tenure profiles for the employed in the program
group do not statistically differ from those for the employed in the control group.9 How-
ever, although the earnings-tenure profiles for the employed in the program and control
groups are the same, a closer examination of the data indicates that hours are higher in
both provinces for those individuals eligible for the SSP, consistent with the program’s
focus on full-time work.
In the final component of our analysis, we switch from using the experimental pro-
gram group data to test the model to using it to help calibrate the model. This switch
embodies in our context the very general tradeoff between using additional restrictions
for testing versus using them for calibration or estimation. For example, in a common
effects linear instrumental variables context, a researcher with two candidate instrumen-
tal variables must choose between using both for estimation, or using one to test the
exogeneity of the other. A natural approach within our framework starts with using the
experimental variation to test the model and then switches to using it for estimation or
calibration once a satisfactory model is found. In the SSP context, using the experimental
program group in the calibration changes the results in New Brunswick but not in British
Columbia.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows: Section 2 presents a prototypical
matching model with endogenous search intensity. Section 3 outlines our methodol-
ogy for testing the model and presents data on the social experiment used to test the
model. A comparison of the model experiment and social experiment, including formal
model tests, is presented in Section 4, along with sensitivity analysis and the analysis
that uses the experimental variation for calibration rather than for testing. Section 5
concludes.
2 Themodel
In this section, we present the model of the labor market that we use to conduct equi-
librium program evaluations. Three segments of the market are incorporated in the
model: individuals may be employed (E), unemployed and receiving unemployment
benefits (U) or on Income Assistance (A).10 This feature of the model allows us to
consider how currently employed workers, unemployed individuals and Income Assis-
tance recipients interact in the labor market. The model builds on the standard DMP
framework where individuals maximize expected lifetime income by choosing their
labor market state and the intensity with which they search for work if not employed.
The model is extended to incorporate the details of the Income Assistance program
and time limitations for entry to and exit from the unemployment insurance program.
We focus here on the problem faced by workers and abstract from the wage deter-
mination process and the model equilibrium.11 The reason for this abstraction is that
we are only able to evaluate the performance of the model in partial equilibrium: the
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social experiment we use to test the model affects only a small number of individu-
als and as such is not expected to have any effects on the distribution of wages in the
economy.
Key features of typical unemployment insurance and Income Assistance programs are
incorporated in the model as follows. First, individuals face time limitations regarding
entry to and exit from the unemployment system. Individuals who enter employment
from Income Assistance or who have exhausted their unemployment benefits become
eligible to receive unemployment benefits after I months of employment. The number
of benefit months subsequently increases by one month for each additional month of
employment, from a minimum of umonths up to a maximum of u¯months. Workers who
enter employment with unused benefits retain their unused benefit months and accu-
mulate additional months with each month worked. Second, individuals who exhaust
their unemployment benefits and do not secure a job are assumed to transit directly to
Income Assistance. Finally, it is assumed that individuals can remain on Income Assis-
tance indefinitely or transit to employment if they contact a firm with a vacancy; Income
Assistance recipients cannot transit directly from IA to unemployment. In the following
sections, we describe the problems faced by individuals in each labor force state in the
model.
2.1 IA Recipients
IA recipients receive benefits (ba) and pay search costs ca[ p(0)z] everymonth they remain
on IA, where z is the elasticity of search costs with respect to search effort, ca is a parame-
ter capturing the disutility of search effort, and p(i) is optimal search effort for individuals
with i months of unemployment benefits remaining. The cost of search depends directly
on the intensity with which individuals search within the model. In particular, for values
of z > 1, the marginal cost of search increases as search effort increases. If IA recipients
contact a firm with a vacancy, they transit to employment. Otherwise, they remain on IA




ba − ca[ p(0)z]+β
[
m(0)VE(1, 0) + (1 − m(0))VA
]}
,
where m(0) is the match rate for IA recipients, β is the discount factor, VE(1, 0) is
the value of the first period of employment, and VA is the value of being on Income
Assistance. The only reason IA recipients are not employed is because an employment
opportunity is not available and the only way an IA recipient can increase the likelihood
of finding a job is through increased search effort. As we will see below the match rate
m(0) is determined in part by search effort p(0).12
2.2 Unemployed individuals
Unemployed agents receive exogenous unemployment benefits (bu) and pay search costs
cu[ p(i)z]. We make the simplifying assumption that unemployment benefits are indepen-
dent of the individual’s pre-separation earnings.With probabilitym(i), individuals contact
a firm with a vacancy and transit to employment in the next month. If individuals remain
unemployed in the next month, it is assumed they can continue to collect unemployment
benefits until benefits are exhausted. Following the last month of benefit eligibility, indi-
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viduals can either transit to employment, if a job opportunity is available, or transit to IA.






bu − cu[ p(i)z]
+β [m(i)VE(1, i − 1) + (1 − m(i))VU(i − 1)]} 1 < i ≤ u¯,
maxp(i)
{
bu − cu[ p(i)z]
+β [m(1)VE(1, 0) + (1 − m(1))VA]} i = 1.
2.3 Workers
The value of employment for a worker depends on her job tenure t and unemploy-
ment eligibility status i, where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,u, . . . , u¯}. As noted above, the number of
months an individual with no benefits must work to qualify for unemployment is I.
For every period an individual works beyond the qualifying period I, months of eli-
gibility i increases by 1. The maximum number of benefit months an individual can
accumulate is denoted u¯. If the individual were not working she would therefore be unem-
ployed with i periods of benefits remaining. With probability δ, jobs are exogenously
destroyed in the subsequent month, in which case workers transit to Income Assistance
if they have not yet qualified for unemployment benefits (i = 0) and transit to unem-
ployment otherwise. With probability (1 − δ) workers remain employed in the next
month.
It is assumed that individuals who return to work before their unemployment benefits
expire retain their remaining unemployment benefit eligibility. Finally, workers experi-
ence on-the-job wage growth for a maximum of T months, after which the wage remains
constant, where it is assumed T > u¯. The value function for a worker with outside option




w(t, 0) + β [(1 − δ)VE(t + 1, 0) + δVA] if t < I and i = 0,
w(t, 0) + β [(1 − δ)VE (t + 1,u)+ δVU (u)] if t = I and i = 0,
w(t, i) + β [(1 − δ)VE(t + 1, i) + δVU(i)] if 0 < i < u¯
and t < I,
w(t, i) + β [(1 − δ)VE(t + 1, i + 1) + δVU(i + 1)] if 0 < i < u¯
and I ≤ t < T ,
w(t, u¯) + β [(1 − δ)VE(t + 1, u¯) + δVU(u¯)] if i = u¯
and I ≤ t < T ,
w(T , u¯) + β [(1 − δ)VE(T , u¯) + δVU(u¯)] if t ≥ T ,
where w(t, i) is the wage for a person with tenure t who has unemployment eligibility i.
2.4 Search technology
We assume there is no on-the-job search in the economy. The probability that a jobless
individual receives a job offer depends on the probability the worker contacts a firm and
the probability a firm has a vacancy. It is assumed that every firm employs at most one
worker.
2.4.1 Workers
The probability a firm has a vacancy is simply the total number of vacancies divided by
the total number of firms VF . Applications for jobs arrive according to a Poisson process,
where λ is the average number of applications filed by workers at each firm. It is further
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assumed that firms randomly draw workers from the applicant pool if there is more than




The conditional re-employment probabilities for unemployed workers and workers on
Income Assistance can then be expressed as the product of the above components,












U(i) is the number of unemployed workers with i months of unemployment insurance
benefits remaining, A is the number of workers on IA, and p(0) and p(i) denote the con-
tact probabilities for IA recipients and unemployed individuals with i periods of UI receipt
remaining, respectively.14 The contact probabilities are choice variables for the workers
within the model and can be interpreted as search effort. Workers determine the optimal
level of search effort by equating the marginal benefit from an increase in search effort
with its marginal cost.15 The optimal level of search effort, for each labor market state














VE(1, 0) − VA
]) 1z






VE(1, i − 1) − VU(i − 1)
]) 1z
, 1 < i ≤ u¯.
The model presented above is a well-known model of the labor market. It contains
features common to many unemployment and welfare programs and is a model that is
straightforward to extend to study many policy reforms. In the next section, we evaluate
the performance of the above aspects of the model using experimental data from the SSP.
3 Testing themodel with experimental data
In this section, we describe a way to use social experiments as a test of the predictive
power of the model. The social experiment we consider here is the Canadian Self-
Sufficiency Project. The Self-Sufficiency Project provides an ideal application for this
paper, as the policy implemented in the experiment is relatively straightforward to intro-
duce in the model and no additional parameters need to be calibrated. We start by
providing some details on the SSP and then outline our approach for conducting a partial
equilibrium policy evaluation of the Self-Sufficiency Project.16
The Canadian Self-Sufficiency (SSP) experiment focused on long-term IA recipients.17
The universe for the experiment was long-term single parent IA recipients ages 19 and
older in selected areas in British Columbia and New Brunswick from November 1992 to
March 1995. This universe was sampled at random.18 Of those selected, 6,028 recipients
volunteered to participate in the experiment and were subsequently placed in program
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and control groups by random assignment.19 Individuals assigned to the program group
were informed that they were to receive an earnings supplement if they found a full-time
(30 hours per week) job within one year and left Income Assistance. The supplement
received by members of the program group depends on their labor market earnings.20 In
particular, the supplement payment equals one-half of the difference between the earn-
ings of the recipient and a benchmark earnings level, set at $37,000 in British Columbia
and at $30,000 in New Brunswick for those earning less than the benchmark earnings
level. Once individuals start receiving the supplement, they continue to do so for up to
three years, as long as they remain employed full-time. Individuals in the program group
who were not able to secure full-time employment within the twelve months following
random assignment were not eligible to receive the supplement. Individuals in the control
group were never eligible for the supplement.
The data contain information on 5,685 recipients in themain study: 2,827 control group
members and 2,858 program group members.21 From the full sample, 4,371 single moth-
ers provided information for the 18, 36, and 54 month follow-up surveys. We eliminate a
further 1,025 observations for those individuals already employed at random assignment.
The remaining sample contains 3,346 respondents, of whom 1,671 are members of the
control group and 1,675 are members of the program group.22 This final sample is the
one we use for our analysis.
The process we undertake to evaluate the model (and our calibration of it) involves the
following three stages:
1. Calibrate the model to the populations targeted by the SSP social experiment and
to the control group in the social experiment in each province. This represents the
model control groups.
2. Introduce the Self-Sufficiency Project in the model as an experiment. Simulate the
behavioral effects of the program in partial equilibrium for each province. This
represents our model program groups.
3. Compare the levels and impacts predicted by the model to those observed in the
data. This exercise provides evidence on how well our model and simulated
experiment are able to replicate the impacts generated by the actual experiment. It
is important to emphasize that the partial equilibrium version of the model is the
appropriate comparison to the experiment because the experiment only affected a
small subset of the economy and as such is not expected to have equilibrium
impacts, as compared to a change in policy affecting all IA recipients.
Each step will be discussed in detail below.
3.1 Calibration of the model control group
In this section, we calibrate the model presented above to data on single mothers with-
out completed post-secondary education23 and to data on the control group from the
experiment. The model is calibrated separately for British Columbia and New Brunswick,
the two provinces in which the SSP experiment was implemented. There are two main
reasons that we chose calibration as opposed to estimation. The first is comparability. Cal-
ibration is a standard way to conduct a quantitative analysis using a DMP-style search and
matching model. Since this literature has a great interest in the general equilibrium impli-
cations of policy interventions, we chose calibration in this case so that we could speak
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directly to this literature. Second, some of the key parameters that were calibrated would
not have been identified non-parametrically given the data available in the SSP context.24
More broadly, for the most part we are using the same information to calibrate the model
that we would have used had we estimated the model. So the parameter values from an
estimation exercise would likely not differ substantially from those reported here.
The parameters for the partial equilibrium version of the model include monthly
Income Assistance and unemployment benefits (ba and bu, respectively), the wage pro-
file, the size of the labor force (L), the vacancy rate (V/F), the job separation rate (δ),
the discount factor (β), and the search friction parameters (ca, cu, z). The values used
for these parameters are all reported in Table 1. Monthly Income Assistance benefits
(ba) for single mothers are based on the average IA benefits for a single parent with one
child during the 1990s, as reported in the National Council of Welfare Reports (2002).
Over this period the average monthly Income Assistance benefit in British Columbia
was $927 and in New Brunswick was $737. Unemployment insurance benefits (bu) are
set at 55 percent of average earnings. In both provinces, the earnings sample is limited
to single mothers without completed post-secondary education, as we are attempting to
isolate that segment of the labor market most similar to individuals receiving Income
Assistance.25 The earnings data are based on the usual hourly wage, as reported in the
monthly Labour Force Survey (1997-2000), assuming a 37.5 hour work week.26,27 We
Table 1Moments and parameters for single mothers without completed postsecondary education
British Columbia New Brunswick
Income Assistance benefits, monthly (ba)1 927 737





Minimum (u) 5 7
Maximum (u¯) 10 12
Average job tenure, months (1/δ)4 46.68 47.28
Average hourly wage4 10.65 7.78
Average wage, tenure > 48 months 11.12 8.22
Wage growth equation w(t) = 7.89 + 0.0891t 6.04 + 0.0418t
−0.000378t2 −0.0000736t2
+6.10 × 10−7t3 +5.51 × 10−8t3
Minimum wage (w)5 5.50 5.00
Vacancy rate (V/F)6 3.20 3.20
Exogenous job separation rate (δ)7 0.0214 0.0211
Monthly discount factor (β)8 0.9835 0.9835
Elasticity of search costs w.r.t effort (z)9 1.8457 1.8457
Notes: All values are in 1992 Canadian dollars. 1. National Council of Welfare (2002). 2. Unemployment benefits are based on 55
per cent of average monthly earnings from the Labour Force Survey (1997–2000). 3. Information on EI eligibility rules is from
Lin et al. (1998). 4. Labour Force Survey (1997–2000). 5. Minimumwage at the beginning of the the SSP experiment (Michalopoulos
et al. 2002). 6. Galarneau et al. (2001), based on the average for retail trade and consumer services and labor-intensive tertiary
manufacturing sectors. 7. Inverse of average job tenure in the Labour Force Survey (1997–2000). 8. This corresponds to an annual
discount factor of 0.82, the factor used for all figures and tables in Davidson andWoodbury (1993). 9. From Christensen et al. (2005)
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use data from the Labour Force Survey, as opposed to experimental data, as there is not
enough wage data (in particular at jobs of long durations) available in the SSP to esti-
mate the full wage distribution by tenure. We estimate a regression with the wage as
the dependent variable and a cubic in tenure as the independent variables. We gener-
ate predicted values from the regression, for tenures of 1 to 48 months, and multiply
the predicted values by 37.5 to obtain a full-time earnings value for each level of tenure.
Full-time earnings for those with tenure greater than 48 months are set equal to full-
time earnings for workers with tenure equal to 48 months. Earnings, IA benefits and
unemployment benefits are all converted to 1992 dollars using the all-goods CPI.28 The
resulting monthly unemployment benefits level is $952 in British Columbia and $695 in
New Brunswick.
The model is homogeneous of degree zero in L and F ; we can therefore normalize the
size of the labor force to 100 without loss of generality. The number of firms in the econ-
omy will be estimated in the baseline model and is identified using the observed vacancy
rate in the economy. The following relation determines V endogenously as a function of
F and E:
F = E + V .




The vacancy rate of 3.20% is taken from Galarneau et al. (2001) and is based on the aver-
age for the retail trade and consumer services and labor-intensive tertiary manufacturing
sectors, both of which have average incomes similar to our sample. Therefore, using the
above equations, and for a given value of E,
F = E
(1 − 0.032) .
The job separation rate in the model (δ) is constant and can be directly estimated by the
average job tenure for single mothers with no completed post-secondary education in the
monthly Labour Force Survey (1990-2000). Job tenure is only reported for individuals cur-
rently employed in the data: we do not have direct information on separations. However,












Average job tenure in the Labour Force Survey (LFS 1990–2000) implies a separation rate
of 0.0214 in British Columbia and of 0.0121 in New Brunswick.29
We use parameter estimates for our search cost function from Christensen et al. (2005),
whose estimates of the elasticity of search costs imply z = 1.8457, and we set the monthly
discount factor β equal to 0.9835, corresponding to an annual discount factor of 0.82 as in
Davidson and Woodbury (1993). We assess the sensitivity of our results to these param-
eters in Section 4.4 below, as these parameters cannot be directly identified from the
Canadian data. The costs of search are allowed to differ depending on whether individ-
uals are receiving unemployment insurance or Income Assistance to capture the notion
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that searching may be less costly while unemployed. For example, unemployed individu-
als may have access to better search technologies through unemployment offices than do
IA recipients, which would be consistent with ca > cu.
To identify the search friction parameter ca, we use the Income Assistance-to-work
transition rate, m(0), directly observed from the SSP control group. Our model assumes
that neither individual search effort nor the probability of a match vary with tenure on
IA; put differently, it assumes a constant exit hazard from IA to employment. We show
later on that this assumption matches the control group data well. The data on the control
group do not provide information on the transition from unemployment to work neces-
sary to identify the search friction for this group (cu). Instead we use the search friction
implied by the unemployment-to-work transition rate of the low skilled labor force.30
Next we must specify the length of time a worker is eligible for unemployment ben-
efits. The length of the unemployment eligibility period depends on the unemployment
rate in each province and on the worker’s previous job tenure. We set the eligibility
periods in the model according to the eligibility rules during the 1990s. This implies
that a worker is entitled to 5 (7) months of benefits after working 4 (3) months and
10 (12) months of benefits after working 9 (8) months or more in British Columbia
(New Brunswick).31
3.2 Constructing the model treatment group
The following additions are made to the model to incorporate the Self-Sufficiency
Project.32 First, individuals on IA face several time constraints. IA recipients become
eligible for SSP after they have been on Income Assistance a minimum of 12 months.
Once eligible for SSP, individuals have 12 months to find employment in order to receive
supplement payments. If an individual secures a job before the eligibility period ends,
she can receive the supplement while employed for a maximum of 36 calendar months.
Consistent with the SSP treatment implemented in the experiment, individuals have one
eligibility period for the treatment. Once the eligibility period for the supplement pay-
ments expires, individuals return to the regular IA system. Second, eligible individuals
who find work receive supplement payments that are a function of their earnings upon
obtaining employment. As in the baseline version of the model, earnings increase with
job tenure. One goal of the SSP is to provide workers with enough time to experience
sufficient earnings growth so that employment remains an attractive alternative once the
earnings supplement expires. On-the-job earnings growth, which results from increases
in the surplus created in worker-firm matches in our model, captures this particular fea-
ture of the program. In the following section, we assess the ability of the calibrated model
to match the main features of the experimental data.
4 Comparing themoments of themodel experiment with themoments of the
social experiment
We now compare the predicted partial equilibrium effects of SSP to those found in the
SSP experiment. This comparison represents the specification test of our model, in the
same spirit as the comparisons of experimental and non-experimental partial equilibrium
estimates in LaLonde (1986) and other, similar papers in the treatment effects literature.
Throughout our empirical work, we treat the model predictions as constants when per-
forming statistical tests comparing the model predictions to the SSP data. This serves to
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strengthen the inferences we draw from the test results by making the tests more con-
servative. It is important to emphasize that we do not use any information on the SSP
program group in the calibration of our model; we are interested in determining whether
the model can predict the behavior of the program group without exploiting the varia-
tion introduced by the experiment. Later, in Section 4.5, we show that using the extra
variation introduced by the experiment affects the predictive performance of the model
in New Brunswick but not British Columbia, further illustrating the usefulness of our
model test.
In order to mimic the experimental design of the SSP, we solve the partial equilibrium
model, using a fixed earnings profile, to obtain the conditional re-employment probabili-
ties. After calibrating and simulating the model, we select those individuals who received
Income Assistance benefits for 12 months. The re-employment probabilities from this
simulated sample represent the simulated control group. We then use the calibrated
parameters and solve for the re-employment probabilities for an individual on IA who
is offered the SSP supplement. Again, this is done in partial equilibrium, implying any
change in behavior will not have an impact on any other individuals, or on the earnings
distribution.33 The re-employment probabilities in this instance represent the program
group in our simulation.
4.1 Search intensity
As a test of the importance of endogenous search intensity, we compare the Income Assis-
tance survival probabilities, at six month intervals, for the control and program groups in
the social experiment and in the model simulation graphically in Fig. 1 and with formal
tests in Table 2. If search intensity were fixed, then the transition rate from IA to work
should remain unchanged once the SSP is introduced in the partial equilibrium version
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Fig. 1 Actual and Simulated Impact of SSP. The solid line is the data; the shaded area is a 95% point-wise
confidence interval; the dashed line is the simulation
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Table 2 Income assistance survival probabilities
British Columbia
Month Simulated Actual Simulated Actual
Control Control Program Program Simulated Actual
Group Group p-value Group Group p-value Impact Impact p-value
6 0.904 0.895 0.384 0.809 0.836 0.030 −0.095 −0.058 0.026
12 0.817 0.787 0.033 0.643 0.616 0.110 −0.175 −0.171 0.881
18 0.739 0.714 0.107 0.581 0.543 0.026 −0.158 −0.171 0.572
24 0.668 0.669 0.922 0.525 0.507 0.287 −0.143 −0.162 0.400
30 0.604 0.618 0.390 0.475 0.476 0.956 −0.129 −0.142 0.561
36 0.546 0.569 0.171 0.429 0.436 0.675 −0.117 −0.133 0.501
42 0.493 0.511 0.316 0.388 0.410 0.198 −0.105 −0.101 0.853
48 0.446 0.482 0.033 0.351 0.410 0.062 −0.095 −0.073 0.817
53 0.410 0.428 0.299 0.322 0.343 0.195 −0.088 −0.084 0.883
1–53 0.364 0.333
New Brunswick
Month Simulated Actual Simulated Actual
Control Control Program Program Simulated Actual
Group Group p-value Group Group p-value Impact Impact p-value
6 0.876 0.866 0.417 0.650 0.806 0.001 −0.226 −0.060 0.001
12 0.767 0.766 0.942 0.381 0.626 0.001 −0.386 −0.140 0.001
18 0.672 0.639 0.048 0.333 0.510 0.001 −0.338 −0.129 0.001
24 0.588 0.584 0.798 0.292 0.470 0.001 −0.296 −0.114 0.001
30 0.515 0.530 0.399 0.256 0.433 0.001 −0.260 −0.097 0.001
36 0.451 0.451 0.984 0.224 0.361 0.001 −0.227 −0.090 0.001
42 0.395 0.394 0.940 0.196 0.323 0.001 −0.199 −0.071 0.001
48 0.346 0.359 0.455 0.172 0.298 0.001 −0.174 −0.062 0.001
53 0.310 0.294 0.332 0.154 0.248 0.001 −0.156 −0.046 0.001
1–53 0.576 0.001
Note: p-values for single months are based on t-tests that the actual fraction still on IA minus the model prediction is equal to
zero. For the all months test, we use a log-rank test that the actual (pooled) exits from IA are equal to the predicted (pooled) exits
for the model and the data. The statistical tests treat the model predictions as constants
constant). In our (relatively) simple model, in which we omit a reservation wage channel,
endogenous search intensity is the only channel through which the transition rate can dif-
fer in this case; as such, we have a direct test of the assumption of endogenous versus fixed
search intensity. We construct survival probabilities from the simulated model using the
IA to employment transition rates for IA recipients in the simulated program and control
groups.We start by discussing the results for British Columbia. The basic patternmatches
the experimental data very well. Both the model and the experiment indicate that the SSP
top-up reduces the Income Assistance survival rate substantially. During the 12 months
of program eligibility, individuals increase their search effort and as a result transit to
employment at a faster rate. Once the 12 month eligibility period is over, behavior reverts
back to what it was in the absence of the program, and the transition rate to employment,
conditional on tenure, returns to exactly what it was in the absence of the treatment.
It is very encouraging that the model correctly predicts not only the basic pattern, but
also matches the proportion of the program group remaining on Income Assistance 54
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months after random assignment. For each month, we test the hypotheses that the model
matches the experiment for the control group and for the program group, and the hypoth-
esis that the simulated impact of the experiment matches the actual impact. The p-values
for the joint hypothesis tests provide support for the model in this instance as the model
is not significantly, or substantively, different from the experimental data at conventional
significance levels.
As an additional test of how well the model predicts behavior, we reproduce a sec-
ond experiment designed to estimate the delayed exit from Income Assistance that may
result from the 12 month qualification period. The delayed-exit experiment was a sep-
arate experiment conducted on a sample of 3,315 single parents in their first month of
Income Assistance receipt in the metropolitan area of Vancouver, British Columbia. This
sample was randomly assigned to program and control groups, where the program group
was told that they would become eligible for the SSP program if they remained on Income
Assistance for 12 months. The difference between the fraction remaining on Income
Assistance in the program and control groups 12 months after random assignment is esti-
mated by Ford et al. (2003) to be 3.9 percentage points with a standard error of 1.4. We
conduct the same experiment in our model in partial equilibrium. The model predicts a
delayed-exit effect of 4.3 percentage points in British Columbia, which is within one-third
of one standard error of the effect estimated by Ford et al. (2003). The model is thus able
to predict the magnitude of the experimental delayed-exit effect quite well. Comparing
the model predictions with the experimental impacts, we can see that the model correctly
predicts both the degree of delayed exit associated with the expectation of receiving the
SSP benefit in the future (the entry effect) as well as the increased transition rate into
employment that becoming eligible for the SSP program induces.
We come to a different conclusion upon examining the results for New Brunswick. As
expected, the model provides a close fit to the control group. However, the simulated
impact of the program on income assistance survival probabilities is significantly greater
than that in the data. This is a substantial difference; the simulated impacts for months
12, 24, 36 and 48 are 2.76, 2.6, 2.52 and 2.8 times as large as the actual impacts. Our cur-
rent parameterization of search intensity is not able to accurately predict the behavioral
response to the introduction of the SSP in New Brunswick. We provide a more detailed
explanation for this finding below.
4.2 Job destruction
Job destruction in the standard model is governed by a constant, exogenous job destruc-
tion rate.34 To evaluate this feature of the model, we compare the employment survival
rates for the program and control groups in the data for those individuals who are
employed 12 months after random assignment. Table 3 presents Kaplan-Meier survival
rates for the program and control groups in the data. The first issue we consider is whether
an exogenous job destruction rate is consistent with the experimental data. Two obser-
vations are of interest. First, formal statistical tests indicate that the survival rates are
not significantly different for the program and control groups in the data.35 As in the
model, the experimental data do not suggest the SSP has an impact on the job destruc-
tion rate in either province. Further, the data do not suggest that the job destruction rate
increases after workers stop receiving supplement payments. Both features of the data are
consistent with an exogenous job destruction rate in this context.
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Table 3 Employment survival probabilities, conditional on being employed in month 12 following
random assignment
British Columbia New Brunswick
Month Control Program Control Program
Group Group p-value Group Group p-value
18 0.748 0.697 0.121 0.738 0.774 0.244
24 0.497 0.521 0.514 0.560 0.629 0.055
30 0.395 0.446 0.166 0.485 0.527 0.251
36 0.333 0.389 0.118 0.405 0.449 0.216
42 0.281 0.327 0.175 0.366 0.390 0.489
48 0.265 0.288 0.485 0.340 0.346 0.859
53 0.248 0.255 0.838 0.314 0.325 0.748
13–53 0.675 0.499
Note: p-values are for a t-test of equality of fraction still employed between the control and treatment group in the selected
months. The test for months 13–53 is a log-rank test of equality of the survival functions, conditional on being employed in
month 12
However, the data in Table 3 on both the program and control groups do not support the
assumption of a constant job destruction rate. For both the program and control groups,
the employment exit hazard rate is decreasing with the duration of employment in both
provinces. There are several possible explanations behind this pattern. One possibility
is that there is heterogeneity in job destruction rates across jobs; over time, the sample
of remaining matches contains a disproportionate number of jobs with low destruction
rates. Another possibility is that workers and firms learn about the true match value over
time, so that low quality matches separate at a faster rate, as in Jovanovic (1979) and
Jovanovic (1984).
4.3 Earnings
One question of interest is whether earnings adjust in response to the introduction of
an earnings supplement. In the partial equilibrium version of the model we consider, it
is assumed earnings do not adjust to the policy change in the experiment because the
number of individuals who receive the supplement is small. This assumption appears to
be supported by the data, as there are no statistically significant differences between the
(conditional on employment) earnings of the program and control groups in the exper-
imental data in British Columbia and a significant difference only in month 6 for New
Brunswick, as illustrated in Table 4.
Taking a closer look at the data, however, provides a slightly different picture. In British
Columbia in particular, hourly wages for the program group are substantially (and signifi-
cantly) lower than those for the control group 12months after random assignment, almost
$2 per hour lower in this month. There are few differences in hourly wages between
the program and control groups in New Brunswick, as individuals in each group enter
employment at wages that are closer to the minimum wage. When differences do exist,
they are less than $0.75 per hour. Program group members work substantially (and sig-
nificantly) more hours than members of the control groups in both provinces, reflecting
the hours requirement for collecting supplement payments. In month 12, program group
members in British Columbia work an average of 17 more hours per month, while in
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Table 4 Average earnings, wages and hours
British Columbia
Average Monthly Earnings Average Hourly Wage Average Monthly Hours
Control Program Control Program Control Program
Month Group Group p-value Group Group p-value Group Group p-value
1 763 698 0.240 8.96 9.22 0.731 92 91 0.858
6 965 967 0.976 10.00 8.98 0.048 104 117 0.034
12 970 1,010 0.462 10.37 8.44 0.000 106 123 0.001
18 1,066 1,072 0.922 10.61 8.86 0.000 112 125 0.020
24 1,186 1,124 0.424 10.73 8.83 0.000 119 130 0.033
30 1,184 1,177 0.922 10.44 9.11 0.003 121 130 0.076
36 1,321 1,199 0.111 10.88 9.59 0.003 123 127 0.474
42 1,402 1,386 0.825 11.07 10.25 0.020 131 135 0.481
48 1,431 1,433 0.978 11.23 10.94 0.440 134 135 0.831
53 1,447 1,443 0.963 11.10 11.26 0.688 132 135 0.559
1-53 0.5961 0.0448 0.2660
New Brunswick
Average Monthly Earnings Average Hourly Wage Average Monthly Hours
Control Program Control Program Control Program
Month Group Group p-value Group Group p-value Group Group p-value
1 547 491 0.240 5.98 6.07 0.770 94 87 0.171
6 613 732 0.002 6.40 6.33 0.799 100 116 0.001
12 726 759 0.476 6.50 6.29 0.374 111 121 0.027
18 775 798 0.553 6.80 6.19 0.008 113 129 0.000
24 797 845 0.281 7.10 6.47 0.012 113 128 0.000
30 839 862 0.617 6.99 6.62 0.094 117 128 0.017
36 839 853 0.749 7.13 6.72 0.067 113 126 0.002
42 902 929 0.526 7.13 6.95 0.381 123 131 0.063
48 932 971 0.346 7.31 7.23 0.680 125 134 0.021
53 923 990 0.134 7.45 7.60 0.492 122 130 0.061
1-53 0.1507 0.5801 0.0341
Note: p-values are for a t-test of equality of means between the control and treatment groups in the selected months. The joint
test for months 1-53 is conducted by regressing the dependent variable on time and program status dummies. Observations
with zero hours or wages are excluded
New Brunswick they work an extra 10 hours per month. By the time supplement pay-
ments expire, there are no significant differences in wages or hours across the program
and control groups. In addition, the joint tests suggest there are no significant differences
in hours for British Columbia and wages in New Brunswick.36
The data therefore provide limited evidence to suggest individuals in the program group
respond to the introduction of the earnings supplement by choosing a combination of
lower wages and higher hours that ends up providing the same earnings, conditional
on employment, as the higher wage/lower hours bundle that is chosen by the control
group. Our simple model does not allow for both wages and hours to be determined in
the bargaining process, thus we cannot use this model to explain these features of the
data. The evidence from the experimental data suggests that the intensive margin may
be an interesting margin to consider, especially if reforms of interest depend on hours
requirements.
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4.4 Sensitivity analysis
We next consider the sensitivity of our results to changes in the two parameters that are
not calibrated to match data on the control group or Canadian labor force statistics: β
and z. Both parameters were taken from the search literature, the former from a US study
(Davidson and Woodbury, 1993) and the latter from estimates obtained using Danish
data (Christensen et al., 2005). It is these two parameters that we therefore have the least
confidence in. Table 5 presents evidence on the extent to which our results are sensitive
to the choice of the discount factor (β) and the elasticity of search costs with respect
to search effort (z). It is worth emphasizing that the search friction parameter ca is re-
calibrated in the baseline model for each combination of β and z. Lower values for β serve
to reduce the incentives of individuals on unemployment and those on IA to search as the
Table 5 Sensitivity to the choice of β and z: IA survival probabilities
Parameters SSP Simulations
Annual discount factor (β) 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.77 0.87
Elasticity of search costs (z) 1.50 2.00 3.50 1.85 1.85
British Columbia
Re-calibrated search cost (ca) 0.252 0.170 0.112 0.157 0.224
Simulated versus actual control group (p-values)
12 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033
36 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171
53 0.299 0.299 0.299 0.299 0.299
All months 0.364 0.364 0.364 0.364 0.364
Simulated versus actual program group (p-values)
12 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.513 0.007
36 0.001 0.500 0.001 0.299 0.757
53 0.001 0.660 0.018 0.075 0.468
All months 0.001 0.756 0.003 0.131 0.654
Simulated versus actual impact (p-values)
12 0.001 0.260 0.001 0.383 0.484
36 0.023 0.148 0.001 0.815 0.235
53 0.016 0.655 0.017 0.630 0.803
New Brunswick
Re-calibrated search cost (ca) 0.109 0.070 0.031 0.069 0.093
Simulated versus actual control group (p-values)
12 0.942 0.942 0.942 0.942 0.942
36 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984
53 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332
All months 0.576 0.576 0.576 0.576 0.576
Simulated versus actual program group (p-values)
12 0.001 0.001 0.213 0.001 0.001
36 0.001 0.001 0.251 0.001 0.001
53 0.001 0.001 0.381 0.001 0.001
All months 0.001 0.001 0.988 0.001 0.001
Simulated versus actual impact (p-values)
12 0.001 0.001 0.371 0.001 0.001
36 0.001 0.001 0.431 0.001 0.001
53 0.001 0.001 0.922 0.001 0.001
Note: See notes for Table 2
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value of employment falls. Lower values of ca are then required to match the transitions
into employment from Income Assistance. A similar argument holds for z. If search costs
becomemore elastic (a higher value for z), then lower search costs are necessary to match
the transitions into employment. The re-calibrated values for ca are presented in the top
row of each panel in Table 5.
The remaining rows in Table 5 contain p-values for the following three hypothesis tests.
First, we test whether the simulated survival rate for the control group in the model is
equal to the survival rate for the control group in the data. Note that the p-values are
the same for each parameterization. We recalibrate search costs when β and z change
to match the control group data and, as a result, can achieve the same fit in each case.
Second, we conduct the same set of hypothesis tests for the program group. Finally, we test
whether the simulated impact is equal to the experimental impact. Each test is conducted
at 12, 36, and 53 months. We also test the hypothesis that the total number of exits up to
month 53 is the same in the data and in the model.
In the case of British Columbia, the results indicate that the simulated control group
does not match the experimental control group at the 12 month mark. Thus, the in-
sample tests are able to rule out some aspects of all the parameterizations considered here.
However, assessing whether the model fits the data based only on in-sample fit can be
quite misleading. Two examples of this point are readily observed. First, in several cases
the model fits the control group but cannot replicate the impact of the program. The set
of results for the case where z = 1.500 and β = 0.820 for British Columbia is illustrative
of this point. The model is able to match the control group at 36 and 53 months; how-
ever, the model is not able to match the program group nor the experimental impacts in
the data. In the absence of experimental data, we would be ignorant of the failure of the
model to generate accurate predictions in this instance. This result highlights the fact that
in-sample fit would not reject some parameterizations that our test would reject.
Second, in some cases, the simulated control group does not consistently match the data
despite the fact that the model accurately predicts the impact of the SSP, as in the final
column for British Columbia. It appears we are missing some features of the data that do
not vary across the program and control groups and thus cancel out when computing the
program impact. In this case, wemay reject the model because of its inability to match the
control group when in fact it is able to produce a good estimate of the program impact.
For New Brunswick, the sensitivity analysis indicates that the choice of a high elasticity
of search costs with respect to effort provides a much better fit to the program group,
with no change in fit to the control group. This result suggests that a combination of low
search costs and a high value of z is necessary to fit the data for New Brunswick. It is again
clear that the experimental data provides us with useful information on the performance
of the model under various parameterizations.
4.5 Using the extra variation introduced by the experiment
Social experiments provide a source of exogenous variation that can be used to iden-
tify parameters of interest. In this paper, we use other sources of data for identification
and instead use the exogenous variation introduced by the experiment to test the perfor-
mance of our model. This alternative use of the experimental data is a convincing way
to confirm the model’s ability to capture the responses of agents to new policy changes.
In this section, we determine how well the model would fit the data if we were instead
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to use this additional variation in the calibration process. To this end, we conduct a grid
search over z to determine what parameter values best fit the experimental impact in
the data.37 A comparison between the performance of our benchmark model and that of
the ‘optimal’ calibration is presented in Table 6. For British Columbia, we find the ‘opti-
mal’ parameter values are very close to the benchmark values and that we only make a
small improvement in model fit by taking advantage of the experimental variation. In
the case of New Brunswick, the optimal parameter values are quite different from the
benchmark values. The results from the former province suggest that ignoring the exper-
imental variation in the calibration process does not affect the predictive performance of
the model; the results from the latter suggest the opposite. The fact that the conclusions
across provinces are mixed, despite the fact that identical experiments were implemented
in both provinces, is further evidence of the usefulness of our model test.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we use social experiments as an innovative and rigorous test of a model’s
ability to replicate observed behavior. In particular, we consider the ability of a standard
search model, fit to an experimental control group, to match the program group as a for-
mal test of the model. Our results provide strong support for the model in this instance
along some dimensions but not others. First, we use evidence on the impacts of the SSP
on the IA-to-work transition rates during the 53 months following random assignment as
a test of the specification for search intensity in the model. We find that the model pro-
gram and control groups are not significantly, nor substantively, different from those in
Table 6 Comparison of benchmark and optimal calibration: IA survival probabilities
Parameters British Columbia New Brunswick
Benchmark Optimal Benchmark Optimal
Annual discount factor (β) 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Elasticity of search costs (z) 1.85 1.93 1.85 3.36
Re-calibrated search cost (ca) 0.185 0.176 0.079 0.033
Simulated versus actual control group (p-values)
12 0.033 0.033 0.942 0.942
36 0.171 0.171 0.984 0.984
53 0.298 0.298 0.332 0.332
All months 0.364 0.364 0.576 0.576
Simulated versus actual program group (p-values)
12 0.110 0.010 0.001 0.202
36 0.675 0.825 0.001 0.244
53 0.195 0.426 0.001 0.394
All months 0.333 0.994 0.001 0.998
Simulated versus actual impact (p-values)
12 0.881 0.551 0.001 0.359
36 0.501 0.261 0.001 0.424
53 0.883 0.841 0.001 0.929
Note: p-values for single months are based on t-tests that the actual fraction still on IA minus the model prediction is equal to
zero. For the all months test, we use a log-rank test that the actual (pooled) exits from IA are equal to the predicted (pooled) exits
for the model and the data. The optimal parameter values are those with the maximum p-value for the log-rank test on the
program group. The statistical tests treat the model predictions as constants
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the experimental data for British Columbia but are different for New Brunswick under
our benchmark calibration. The model is also able to match the delayed-exit effects of
a second randomized experiment that offered SSP to new Income Assistance recipients.
Secondly, we find that the employment survival rates in the experimental data are consis-
tent with an exogenous, but not a constant, job destruction rate. Our analysis also points
to several extensions that may help in explaining other features of the data, including the
joint determination of hours and wages.
It is important to emphasize two points. First, we could not draw this conclusion
without the availability of experimental data. Our analysis highlights a second use of
experimental data that has not been widely exploited in the literature. Second, the exper-
imental data provide strong support for the search framework in this instance along
certain dimensions, most notably the IA-to-work transition in British Columbia, themain
margin over which the SSP is likely to influence behavior. Ourmodel test indicates that the
model captures the fundamental dynamics introduced by the SSP supplement. The data
also support the use of the model in the case of New Brunswick, but under a much dif-
ferent set of parameter values. Considering the widespread use of this model, the results
provide support for the use of this framework to study policy changes that impact the
labor market. It is very important, however, that future work considers the robustness of
this result by exploiting other sources of variation.
It is also worth emphasizing that our model test involves a direct test of a partial
equilibrium version of the model. The reason for this is simple: the social experiment is
conducted on a small sample of individuals and therefore does not have spillover effects
on the rest of the economy. As such, we do not have a direct test of the equilibrium
implications of the potential policy change. That said, we take the fact that the partial
equilibrium version of the model passes our more rigorous test as very convincing evi-
dence in favor of using the model for British Columbia (but not for New Brunswick), as
the model can replicate many of the outcomes produced by a social experiment with-
out the use of the variation introduced by the social experiment. This finding increases
our confidence in equilibrium policy evaluations and the evaluation of potential policies
that can be conducted within the model but were not conducted within the experiment.
In a companion paper (Lise et al. 2004) we use the model presented here to evaluate the
potential spillover effects that may arise should the SSP be implemented as a policy on
a wide scale for British Columbia. Lise et al. (2004) find that several important feedback
effects, including displacement and changes in the equilibrium wage distribution, reverse
the cost-benefit conclusions implied by the partial equilibrium experimental evaluation.
Taken together, both papers illustrate that combining social experiments and models of
the labor market and government assistance programs represents a powerful tool for
policy evaluation.
Endnotes
1For example, see the evaluation of the Reemployment Bonus by Davidson and
Woodbury (1993) and many calibrated studies based on the DMP model such as Cole
and Rogerson (1999) and den Haan et al. (2000). Similarly, Plesca (2010) evaluates the
US Employment Service (i.e., labor exchange), Albrecht et al. (2009) estimate the
equilibrium effects of the large-scale Swedish “Knowledge Lift” program, and Cahuc and
Le Barbanchon (2010) evaluate counseling for the unemployed, all in the context of
DMP-style equilibrium models. Yashiv (2006) considers the within-sample fit of the
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DMP model. Others, such as Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) and Alvarez and Veracierto
(2000), have considered a variety of labor market policies using a modification of the
McCall (1970) search framework. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) consider policy
evaluation in a calibrated equilibrium model using firm-level data.
2A very useful discussion of this and related issues can be found in Hansen and
Heckman (1996).
3See Kydland and Prescott (1996) for a detailed discussion.
4It is also possible to estimate a structural model on a subset of the data, for example a
subset of states, and use the remainder of the data to conduct a validation exercise. See
Keane and Wolpin (2007).
5Crépon et al. (2013) provide experimental estimates of the equilibrium effects of
active labor market programs in France using a unique design that randomizes the
fraction treated at the level of the labor market and individual treatment assignment
within labor markets.
6The ability of the canonical DMP model to fit to the data has recently attracted much
attention. A large literature has now developed, starting from Shimer (2005) and
summarized nicely in Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), on what model features are
necessary for the DMP model to replicate aggregate fluctuations in productivity,
unemployment and vacancies. The simplest version of the DMP model with Nash
bargaining and homogeneous workers and firms does not produce much volatility in
unemployment and vacancies in response to fluctuations in labor productivity. This can
be overcome with, for example, alternative assumptions on wage determination (Hall
2005; Gertler and Trigari 2009) or worker and firm heterogeneity (Lise and Robin 2014).
Recently Hornstein et al. (2011) illustrate quite clearly that without on-the-job search,
this class of models produces very little in the way of wage dispersion.
7In parallel work, Todd and Wolpin (2006) use data from the experimental evaluation
of Mexico’s PROGRESA program to test a structural, dynamic model of fertility and
child schooling using a similar approach. Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005) test a structural
auction model using data from a laboratory experiment. Earlier work by Wise (1985)
uses experimental data on housing subsidies to test a model of housing demand. More
recently, Attanasio et al. (2012) use experimental data in the estimation of their
equilibrium model of PROGRESA, and Gautier et al. (2012) combine experimental data
with data on non-participants from labor markets affected and not affected by the
experiment to estimate the general equilibrium effects of a job search treatment using a
differences-in-differences design.
8A large literature considers various aspects of the Self-Sufficiency Project, including
Bitler et al. (2008), Card and Hyslop (2005), Connolly and Gottschalk (2009), Ferrall
(2012), Foley and Schwartz (2003), Kamionka and Lacroix (2008), Michalopoulos et al.
(2005), Riddell and Riddell (2014), and Zabel et al. (2013). Similar, but less generous,
income supplement programs have been studied in the United States; see Auspos et al.
(2000) on the Minnesota Family Investment Program and Bos et al. (1999) on the
Wisconsin New Hope program. Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001) provide an overview
of the experimental literature and compare these programs to other approaches.
9We do not consider distributional effects of the policy change on earnings, as the
simple model is not well suited to doing so.
10Throughout this paper we use the term unemployed to mean collecting
unemployment benefits. In the model, all jobless individuals are actively seeking
employment; they are distinguished by whether they are receiving unemployment
benefits or Income Assistance benefits.
11The firm’s problem and the equilibrium conditions are outlined in detail in the
Appendix. Section A.2 of the appendix describes how wages are set via Nash bargaining
between the firm and the worker in the context of the minimum wage in the equilibrium
version of the model. We also implicitly assume that the value of employment always
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exceeds the value of being on IA or unemployed so that a match forms whenever a
worker successfully contacts a firm.
12It is worth noting that we assume all Income Assistance recipients enter
employment with tenure zero. This assumption could be relaxed by assuming workers
retain their experience when they enter Income Assistance and allowing experience to
depreciate over time. One implication of this extension would be that the hazard of
leaving IA would decline as the length of the IA spell increased. The drawback of this
extension is that it involves a large increase in the size of the state space.
13Alternatively, we can consider the length of a period tending to zero and work in
continuous time, where there is zero probability of more than one application arriving
simultaneously.
14Note that our matching function, as in Davidson and Woodbury (1993), exhibits
increasing rather than constant returns to scale. While this is a somewhat nonstandard
assumption, it has no effect on our results since our tests are done in partial equilibrium.
We could have equivalently assumed that the job contact probability is simply
proportional to search effort.
15In determining the marginal cost and benefit of search effort λ is held constant under
the assumption that each worker believes her impact is small relative to total labor supply.
16For comprehensive details on the Self-Sufficiency Project, see Michalopoulos et al.
(2002).
17In particular, individuals had to receive IA in the current month and in at least 11
out of 12 of the prior months to be included in the experiment.
18The selected areas were the lower mainland in British Columbia and the lower third
of New Brunswick.
19As noted in Lin et al. (1998), about 90 percent of the target population agreed to be
randomly assigned as part of the main (“recipient”) component of the SSP
demonstration that constitutes our primary focus in this paper. This leaves only modest
scope for biases in the experimental impact estimates when interpreted as applying to
the entire target population rather than just the study population of those who agree to
random assignment. Kamionka and Lacroix (2008) consider the smaller “early entry”
experiment, which we briefly consider in Section 4.1. It attracted only about 80 percent
of its target population into random assignment. Their analysis suggests that this leads
to a substantively meaningful understatement of the effects of the SSP treatment. Sianesi
(2014) provides further useful discussion of these issues, an application to a more recent
experiment, as well as pointers to the broader literature.
20No other sources of income affect the calculation of the earnings supplement.
21Out of the full sample of 6,208 individuals participating in the baseline interview,
2,849 individuals were assigned to the control group, 2,880 were assigned to the program
group, and the remaining 299 were assigned to a third experimental group, the SSP Plus
group. Thus, we are missing information on 464 respondents. A total of 40 respondents
did not meet the criteria for inclusion in the experiment, and 3 control group members
withdrew. An additional 398 individuals could not be contacted or refused to be
interviewed. Lin, Robins, Card, Harknett, and Lui-Gurr (1998) consider the possible
nonresponse biases that may arise and conclude the biases are likely to be small.
22The control group contains 815 recipients from New Brunswick and 856 from
British Columbia, while the program group consists of samples of 813 and 862
respondents from New Brunswick and British Columbia, respectively.
23“Without completed post-secondary education” refers to respondents reporting up
to some post-secondary education but no post-secondary certificate or higher.
24For example, the search intensity parameter (z) would only be identified off the
non-linearity of search costs in preferences in the absence of matched worker-firm data.
The same type of identification strategy would have to be applied in the estimation of
the discount factor.
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25Approximately 14% of the control group in the Self-Sufficiency Project has at least
some post-secondary education: 11.3% of the sample reports having some
post-secondary education and 2.2% of the sample reports having a degree or certificate
from a university.
26The standard full-time weekly hours in Canada is 37.5 hours.
27The Canadian Labour Force Survey is the analogue of the U.S. Current Population
Survey.
28All figures are reported in Canadian dollars, where $1Cdn was approximately equal
to $0.63US at the time of the experiment.
29This measure of job tenure does not take quits into account. As a result, we may
overestimate the job separation rate as individuals moving between jobs because of quits
report holding jobs of shorter durations.
30See Lise et al. (2004) for further details.
31See Lin et al. (1998).
32The model changes required to introduce the SSP are minor. Full details on the
augmented model are presented in the Appendix.
33For example, this means that λ does not change when we introduce the program in
partial equilibrium. We also assume that the introduction of the SSP is not anticipated
by individuals in the simulated program group.
34See Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) for a model with endogenous job destruction.
35See the notes at the bottom of Table 3 for full details.
36As noted by Card and Hyslop (2005) and Zabel et al. (2013), the fact that wages can
only be compared for those members of the program and control groups that work may
be problematic. In the spirit of most relatively simple search and matching models in the
DMP tradition, we ignore issues surrounding unobserved heterogeneity in this paper.
37The grid is over z ∈ {1.50, 3.50} with an interval size of 0.005. We do not search over
both β and z, as the discount factor is not separately identified from search costs. For
each value of z we consider, the search costs parameter ca is recalibrated to match the IA
survival function for the control group. Our measure of best fit is the maximum p-value
for the joint test (all months) of simulated versus actual impacts for IA survival
probabilities.
38We assume for simplicity that individuals entering employment from unemployment
with remaining benefit months available start accumulating benefit months immediately.
39If the individual’s earnings are above the ceiling, they do not receive a supplement.
For simplicity, we abstract from this case within the model as few individuals had
earnings above the supplement ceiling in the data. In the model no individuals have
earnings above the supplement ceiling.
40In the actual SSP experiment, once individuals qualified for the earnings supplement
they could transit between employment and IA and collect the supplement payments in
any month they were employed full-time during the 36 months after qualifying. We
abstract from this in the model as it would add an unmanageable number of states.
Instead, we allow those who lose their job prior to qualifying for unemployment benefits
to transit back to the first period of SSP eligibility.
41 It is assumed that I < Tend , which is consistent with the actual EI and IA programs.
42Production takes place when there is a match between one firm and one worker; the
number of firms can alternatively be interpreted as the number of jobs in the economy.
43 Alternatively, we can consider the length of a period tending to zero and work in
continuous time, where there is zero probability of more than one application arriving
simultaneously.
44In determining the marginal cost and benefit of search effort λ is held constant under
the assumption that each worker believes her impact is small relative to total labor supply.
45See Judd (1998) Ch.4, p. 114 and Ch.5, pp. 168–171.
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Appendix A: The basic model
A.1 Firms
Production takes place when there is a match between one firm and one worker; the
number of firms can alternatively be interpreted as the number of jobs in the economy.
There is free entry in the economy. In every period, each firm has the option of filling a
vacancy, if one exists, by hiring a worker or keeping the vacancy open. If matched with
a worker, firms earn profits that depend on the surplus generated by the match and pay
wages, determined in equilibrium, that depend on the worker’s outside options and the
minimum wage. Profits depend on the worker’s tenure to allow match-specific capital
to increase the productivity of the match over time. Denote the surplus generated by a
worker-firm pair of tenure t by S(t). With probability δ the match separates and the firm
is left with a vacancy in the following month. Denote the profits of a firm matched with a
worker with outside option i, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,u, . . . , u¯} and match tenure t as (t, i).
The expected discounted present value of profits for matches of job tenure t and
workers with outside option i are
E(t, i) = S(t)−w(t, i)+
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
β[ δV + (1 − δ)E(t + 1, 0)] if i = 0 and t < I,
β[ δV + (1 − δ)E(t + 1,u)] if i = 0 and t = I,
β[ δV + (1 − δ)E(t + 1, i + 1)] if 0 < i < u¯ and t < T ,
β[ δV + (1 − δ)E(t + 1, u¯)] if i = u¯ and t < T ,
β[ δV + (1 − δ)E(T , u¯)] if t ≥ T ,
where match tenure beyond T no longer increases profits.
If a firm has a vacancy, the value of the vacancy is determined by the probability of
meeting an unmatched worker, by the profits the firm expects to make from the match,
and by the costs of posting a vacancy (ξ )













where q(i) is the probability a firm matches with a worker with outside option i.
A.1.1Matching probabilities
From the firm’s perspective, the probabilities of meeting potential workers from unem-
ployment and IA equal the fraction of workers from unemployment and IA who transit
to employment, divided by the total number of vacancies





After meeting in the labor market, a firm and a worker bargain over wages by making
alternating wage offers until both sides find the offer acceptable. It is assumed that both
parties have equal bargaining power, but have different threat points. The equilibrium of
this game is the Nash cooperative bargaining solution and results in workers and firms
splitting the surplus of a match evenly. The surplus of the match from the worker’s per-
spective is the difference between employment at the equilibrium wage and the worker’s
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outside option, which depends on their current labor market state and program eligibil-
ity. The surplus from the perspective of the firm is the difference between the profits the
firm receives at the equilibrium wage and the value of leaving the vacancy open. It is fur-
ther assumed that the bargaining process is constrained such that the wage can not fall
below the minimum wage w. The equilibrium wage is max{w(t, i),w}, where w(t, i) solves
VE(t, i) − Vi = E(t, i) − V ,
where Vi ∈ {VA,VU(i)} is the value of the outside option i. In the following section, we
define the steady state conditions for employment, unemployment, and IA.
A.3 Steady state conditions
Let E denote the steady state number of jobs occupied by workers and V the number of
vacancies. By definition, the total number of jobs in the labor market is equal to the total
number of occupied jobs and the total number of vacancies
F = E + V .
Denote the total number of individuals in the labor market by L. The total number of indi-
viduals can be decomposed into three groups. First the employed, who are distinguished






E(t, i) + E¯,
where E¯ is the group of workers no longer experiencing on-the-job wage growth. The
second group, denoted A, consists of individuals on Income Assistance. The final group





where U(i) indicates the number of unemployed persons with i periods of benefits
remaining.
The total number of individuals in the labor market can therefore be expressed as the
sum of the above components
L = E + A + U .
Using the above definitions, we can describe the conditions governing the steady state,
where the flows in and out of every employment state must be equal over time. The steady
state conditions for each state and eligibility combination are discussed in turn below.
A.3.1 Employment
As above, m(0) and m(i) denote the probabilities that IA recipients and unemployment
recipients with i periods of benefits remaining, respectively, match with a firm. The
flow into the first period of employment includes those workers from IA and unemploy-
ment who receive job offers. They are indexed by their respective outside options as this
will determine their progression of benefit entitlements.38 In subsequent periods, the
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inflow consists of workers who were employed in the previous period and who were not
exogenously separated from their jobs
E(1, 0) = m(0)A + m(1)U(1)
E(1, i) = m(i + 1)U(i + 1), 0 < i < u
E(t, 0) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1, 0), 1 < t < I and i = 0
E(t, i) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1, i − 1), 1 < t < T and 0 < i ≤ u¯
E(t, u¯) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1, u¯), 1 < t ≤ T and i > u¯
δE¯ = (1 − δ)E(T , u¯).
A.3.2 Income assistance
The flow into Income Assistance includes those employed workers who were exoge-
nously separated from their jobs and ineligible for unemployment benefits and unem-
ployed workers no longer eligible for unemployment benefits. The flow out of IA





E(t, 0) + (1 − m(1))U(1) = m(0)A.
A.3.3 Unemployment
Employed workers who are separated from their jobs and who are eligible for the max-
imum months of unemployment benefits flow into the first period of unemployment,
U(u¯). For U(i) where 0 < i < u¯, the inflow consists of unemployed workers from the
previous period who did not find jobs and workers separated from their jobs who qualify
for less than the maximum number of benefit months. All workers flow out of the unem-









E(t, i − 1) + (1 − m(i + 1))U(i + 1) = U(i) if 0 < i < u¯.
BModel with self-sufficiency project
The welfare program and the earnings supplement are modeled as follows. First, in addi-
tion to individuals on unemployment insurance, individuals on welfare also face several
time constraints. Second, individuals receive supplement payments that are a function of
the wage upon obtaining employment.
Within the model, agents maximize expected lifetime income by choosing their labor
market state and the intensity with which they search for work if not employed. It is
assumed that agents have no information regarding the existence and structure of the SSP
until month 12 of their IA spell.Workers bargain with firms over wages that depend on the
tenure of the match and on the outside options of both parties. Through this channel, the
model generates predictions regarding how starting wages vary depending on whether an
individual is entering employment through EI or IA and on whether or not the individual
is eligible for the supplement. One goal of the SSP is to provide workers with enough time
to experience sufficient wage growth so they have an incentive to stay employed once the
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earnings supplement expires. On-the-job wage growth, through an increase in the sur-
plus created in worker-firm matches, captures this particular feature of the program and
is also incorporated in the model.
It is useful to expand the notation used in the base model in the fol-
lowing way. Let i index the jobless state an individual is currently in: i ∈
{u¯, . . . ,u, . . . . , 1, 0,−1, . . . ,−Tin, . . . , −Tout}. Here positive i indicates the individual is
jobless with i unemployment benefit months remaining. We use 0 ≥ i ≥ −Tout to
index the welfare recipients, where the key indices are i = 0 in the first month on wel-
fare, i = −Tin in the first month of SSP eligibility, and i = −Tout in the post-eligibility
period.
B.1 Workers
The value of employment for a worker depends on her job tenure t and program eli-
gibility status i, where i ∈ {u¯, . . . ,u. . . . , 1, 0,−1, . . . ,−Tin, . . . ,−Tout}. The number of
months an individual with no benefits must work to qualify for unemployment is I.
For every period an individual works after qualifying for benefits, i increases by 1. The
maximum number of benefit months an individual can accumulate is denoted u¯. If
the individual were not working she would therefore be unemployed with i periods of
unemployment benefits remaining, i ∈ {0, . . . u¯}. With probability δ, jobs are exoge-
nously destroyed in the subsequent month, in which case workers transit to welfare if
they have not yet qualified for unemployment benefits, i = 0, and transit to unem-
ployment otherwise. With probability (1 − δ), workers remain employed in the next
month.
It is assumed that individuals who return to work before their unemployment ben-
efits expire retain their remaining unemployment benefit eligibility. Finally, workers
experience on-the-job wage growth for a maximum of T months, after which the
wage remains constant, where it is assumed T > u¯. The value function for a
worker needs to account for job tenure t, outside option i, and earnings supplement
receipt s ∈ {0, 1}, where s = 0 indicates the worker is not eligible to receive the
supplement.
B.1.1Workers that receive supplement payments
Employed workers who receive the supplement obtain labor market earnings and the
supplement payment in the current month. The supplement received by the worker
is a function of her wage. In particular, the worker receives one-half of the distance
between her wage and an exogenous ceiling denoted w˜; in other words, she receives the
average of her market wage and the wage ceiling.39 Individuals remain eligible for the
supplement for Tend months once they leave Income Assistance and become employed.
Therefore, workers continue to receive the supplement as long as the duration of the cur-
rent employment spell is shorter than the allowed duration of the supplement payment
period. With probability δ workers are exogenously separated from their jobs at which
point they can transit to unemployment if eligible for EI or back to the first period of
SSP eligibility (i = −Tin) if they do not yet qualify for unemployment benefits (t < I).40
Employed persons no longer receiving the supplement (t > TEend) remain
employed, or if they are exogenously separated from their job, transit to EI.41 The value
of being employed and in the states described above can be expressed as





2 [w(t,−Tin, 1) + w˜]
+β [(1 − δ)VE(t + 1,−Tin, 1) + δVA(−Tin)] if t < I,
1
2 [w(t,−Tin, 1) + w˜]+β
[
(1 − δ)VE(t + 1,u, 1) + δVU(u)] if t = I,
1
2 [w(t, i, 1) + w˜]+β
[
(1 − δ)VE(t + 1, i + 1, 1) + δVU(i + 1)] if u < i < u¯
1
2 [w(t, u¯, 1) + w˜]+β
[
(1 − δ)VE(t + 1, u¯, 1) + δVU(u¯)] if i = u¯
1
2 [w(t, u¯, 1) + w˜]+β
[
(1 − δ)VE(t + 1, u¯, 0) + δVU(u¯)] if t = Tend ,
where Tin is the number of months on welfare required to qualify for the SSP supple-
ment and Tend is the number of months an individual can receive the supplement once
employed.
B.2 Welfare recipients that are eligible to receive the supplement
Welfare recipients receive welfare benefits (ba) and pay convex (z > 1) search costs
ca[ p(i)z] in the current month. The cost of search is modelled in amanner consistent with
Davidson and Woodbury (1993), where z is the elasticity of search costs with respect to
search effort, ca is a parameter capturing the disutility of search effort and p(i) is search
effort in period i. The cost of search depends directly on the intensity with which work-
ers search within the model. Let m(i) denote the probability a welfare recipient finds a
job and transits to employment in the next month. With probability (1 − m(i)) the wel-
fare recipient remains on welfare. Welfare recipients eligible for the supplement receive
welfare benefits in the current month. Using the same index i as we used for number of
months of unemployment benefits, we define the first month on Income Assistance as
i = 0, and continue to count down. Individuals are eligible for the earning supplement in
month i = −Tin and become ineligible in month i = −Tout . They remain eligible for the
supplement as long as the duration of their welfare spell is less than the supplement eli-
gibility period (−Tin ≥ i > −Tout). For the duration of the time that they are eligible for
the supplement, they receive a job offer with probability m(i), and if an offer is received,
they have the option of transiting to employment in the next month or remaining on IA. If
they do not receive a job offer, they remain on welfare and, if the eligibility period has not
expired, remain eligible to receive the supplement should they secure employment in the
following month. If eligibility for the supplement expires in the next month and workers
do not receive a job offer, they remain on welfare but are not eligible for the supplement
should they receive a job offer. Once eligibility expires, individuals will not be eligible for
the earnings supplement for the remainder of their duration on IA. The value function






ba − ca[ p(i)z]
+β [m(i)VE(1, i − 1, 1) + (1 − m(i))VA(i − 1)]} , −Tin ≥ i > −Tout
maxp(i)
{
ba − ca[ p(i)z]
+β [m(i)VE(1, 0, 0) + (1 − m(i))VA(−Tout)]} , i = −Tout
B.3 Firms
In every period, the firm has the option of filling a vacancy, if one exists, by hiring a
worker or keeping the vacancy open. If matched with a worker, firms earn profits that
depend on the surplus generated by the match and pay wages, determined in equilibrium,
that depend on the worker’s outside options, the minimum wage, and the worker’s SSP
supplement status. Profits depend on the worker’s tenure to allow match-specific capital
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to increase the productivity of the match over time. Denote the surplus generated by a
worker-firm pair of tenure t by S(t). With probability δ the match separates and the firm
is left with a vacancy in the following month. Denote the profits of a firm matched with
a worker with outside option i, i ∈ {u¯, . . . ,u. . . . , 1, 0,−1, . . . ,−Tin, . . . ,−Tout}, match
tenure t, and SSP supplement eligibility s by (t, i, s).
The expected future profits for matches of job tenure t with workers with outside option
i and SSP eligibility s are
E(t, i, s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
S(t) − w(t, 0, 0) + β[ δV + (1 − δ)E(t + 1, 0, 0)] if 0 ≥ i > −Tin, t < I,
and s = 0,
S(t) − w(t, 0, 0) + β[ δV + (1 − δ)E(t + 1,u, 0)] if i = 0, t = I, and s= 0
S(t) − w(t, i, 0) + β[ δV + (1 − δ)E(t + 1, i + 1, 0)] if 0 < i < u¯, t < T ,
and s = 0,
S(t) − w(t, u¯, 0) + β [δV + (1 − δ)E(t + 1, u¯, 0)] if i = u¯, t < T , and s= 0
S(t) − w(t, i, 1) + β [δV + (1 − δ)E(t + 1,−Tin, 1)] if − Tin ≥ i, t < I,
and s = 1,
S(t) − w(t,−Tin, 1) + β[ δV + (1 − δ)E(t + 1,u, 1)] if − Tin = i, t = I,
and s = 1
S(t) − w(t, i, 1) + β[ δV + (1 − δ)E(t + 1, i + 1, 1)] if u < i < u¯, t < T ,
and s = 1,
S(t) − w(t, u¯, 1) + β[ δV + (1 − δ)E(t + 1, u¯, 1)] if i = u¯, t < Tend ,
and s = 1
S(t) − w(Tend , u¯, 1) + β[ δV + (1 − δ)E(t + 1, u¯, 0)] if i = u¯, t = Tend ,
and s = 1
S(t) − w(t, i, 0) + β[ δV + (1 − δ)E(T , u¯, 0)] if t ≥ T ,
where match tenure beyond T no longer increases profits.
If a firm has a vacancy, the value of a vacancy is determined by the probability ofmeeting
an unmatched worker, by the profits the firm expects to make from the match, and by the
costs of posting a vacancy (ξ )
V = −ξ + β
[∑
i










where s = 1 if −Tin ≥ i > −Tout and s = 0 otherwise.
Firms will post vacancies unless the expected profit from doing so is negative. Thus in
the steady state equilibrium the number of firms in the economy will be determined by
the condition that the expected profits from posting a vacancy are zero.42 Note that this
also requires a free entry assumption.
B.4 Search technology
Assume there is no on-the-job search in the economy. The probability that a jobless indi-
vidual receives a job offer depends on the probability the worker contacts a firm and the
probability a firm has a vacancy.
B.4.1Workers
The probability a firm has a vacancy is simply the total number of vacancies divided by
the total number of firms
V
F .
If a firm has a vacancy, it will hire a worker and pay a wage which is the outcome of Nash
bargaining between the worker and the firm, discussed in detail below. Applications for
jobs arrive according to a Poisson process, where λ is the average number of applications
filed by workers at each firm. It is further assumed that firms randomly draw workers
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from the applicant pool if there is more than one applicant.43 The probability a worker is




The conditional re-employment probabilities for unemployed workers and workers on
income assistance can then be expressed as the product of the above components,
















Recall, p(i) are the contact probabilities of an individual in jobless state i. The contact
probabilities are choice variables for the workers within the model and can be interpreted
as search effort. Workers determine the optimal level of search effort by equating the
marginal benefit from an increase in search effort with its marginal cost.44 The optimal

























VE(1, i − 1, 0) − VA(−Tout)
]) 1z , i = −Tout
B.4.2 Firms
From the firm’s perspective, the probabilities of meeting potential workers from unem-
ployment and welfare are the fraction of workers from unemployment and welfare that
transit to employment, divided by the total number of vacancies
q(i) = m(i)U(i)V , u¯ ≥ i > 0, and q(i) =
m(i)A(i)
V , 0 ≥ i ≥ −Tout
respectively.
B.5 Equilibriumwage determination
After meeting in the labor market, a firm and a worker bargain over wages by making
alternating wage offers until both sides find the offer acceptable. It is assumed that both
parties have equal bargaining power, but may have different threat points. The equilib-
rium of this game is the Nash cooperative bargaining solution and results in workers
and firms splitting the surplus of a match evenly. The surplus of the match from the
worker’s perspective is the difference between employment at the equilibrium wage and
the worker’s outside option, which depends on their current labor market state and pro-
gram eligibility, as well as on SSP supplement eligibility. The surplus from the perspective
of the firm is the difference between the profits the firm receives at the equilibrium wage
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and the value of leaving the vacancy open. It is further assumed that the bargaining pro-
cess is constrained such that the wage can not fall below the minimum wage w. The
equilibrium wage is max{w(t, i, s),w}, where w(t, i, s) solves
VE(t, i, s) − Vj(i) = E(t, i, s) − V ,
and where Vj(i) ∈ {VA(i),VU(i)} is the value of the outside option i. In the following
section, we define the steady state conditions that govern the evolution of the economy.
B.6 Steady state conditions
Let E denote the steady state number of jobs occupied by workers and V the number of
vacancies. By definition, the total number of jobs in the labor market is equal to the total
number of occupied jobs and the total number of vacancies
F = E + V .
Denote the total number of individuals in the labor market by L. The total number of indi-
viduals can be decomposed into three groups. First the employed, who are distinguished









E(t, i, s) + E¯,
where E¯ is the group of workers no longer experiencing on-the-job wage growth. The
second group are on welfare and are distinguished by their welfare duration, which





The final group are unemployed individuals (U), who can remain unemployed for up to a





where U(i) indicates the number of unemployed persons with i periods of benefits
remaining.
The total number of individuals in the labor market can therefore be expressed as the
sum of the above components
L = E + A + U .
Using the above definitions, we can describe the conditions governing the steady state,
where the flows in and out of every labor force state must be equal over time. The steady
state conditions for each state and eligibility combination are discussed in turn below.
B.6.1 Employment
As above, let m(i) denote the probabilities that jobless individuals from jobless state i
match with a firm with a vacancy. The flow into the first period of employment includes
those workers from welfare and unemployment who receive job offers. They are indexed
by their respective outside options and their SSP eligibility as this will determine their
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progression of benefit entitlements. In subsequent periods, the inflow consists of workers
who were employed in the previous period and who were not exogenously separated from
their jobs
E(1, i, 0) = m(i)U(i), u ≥ i > 0
E(1, i, 0) = m(i)A(i), 0 ≥ i > −Tin
E(1, i, 1) = m(i)A(i), −Tin ≥ i > −Tout
E(1, i, 0) = m(i)A(i), i = −Tout
E(t, i, 0) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1, i − 1, 0), 1 < t ≤ T , i > 0 and s = 0
E(t, i, 1) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1, i − 1, 1), 1 < t < Tend , and s = 1
E(t, i, 0) = (1 − δ)E(t − 1, i − 1, 1), t = Tend , and s = 1
δE¯ = (1 − δ)E(T , u¯).
B.6.2Welfare
The flow into the first period of Income Assistance includes those employed workers
who were exogenously separated from their jobs and ineligible for unemployment bene-
fits and unemployed workers no longer eligible for unemployment benefits. The flow into
the first period of SSP eligibility includes those on welfare who have been on welfare long
enough to qualify, plus those who were exogenously separated from jobs in which they
were receiving the SSP supplement but not yet eligible for unemployment benefits. The
flows into all other periods of income assistance consist of those workers in the previous
period of income assistance who did not match with an employer. Finally, those individu-
als who did not find employment before SSP eligibility expired transit to A(−Tout), where








E(t,−Tin, 1) + (1 − m(−Tin + 1))A(−Tin + 1) = A(−Tin)
(1 − m(i + 1))A(i + 1) = A(i), 0 > i > −Tout ,
and i = −Tin
(1 − m(−Tout + 1))A(−Tout + 1) = m(−Tout)A(−Tout).
B.6.3 Unemployment
Employed workers who are separated from their jobs and who are eligible for the max-
imum months of unemployment benefits flow into the first period of unemployment,
U(u¯). For U(i) where 0 < i < u¯, the inflow consists of unemployed workers from the
previous period who did not find jobs, and workers separated from their jobs who qualify
for less than the maximum number of benefit months. All workers flow out of the unem-
ployment state when benefits run out due to the time limitations in the unemployment
insurance program
















+(1 − m(i + 1))U(i + 1) = U(i) if 0 < 1 < u¯.
B.7 Model solution
Solving the model for the control group entails solving a system of 145 equations and
unknowns. The set of equations in the system includes:
1. steady state stocks and flows for unemployment, employment, and IA (12
equations)
2. the value functions for employment, IA, and unemployment (108 equations)
3. the re-employment probability from IA (1 equation)
4. the re-employment probability from UI (10 equations)
5. the number of applications per firm (λ) (1 equation)
6. the first order conditions for search intensity when on IA (1 equation)
7. the first order conditions for search intensity when on UI (10 equations)
8. the number of firms (F = E + V ) (1 equation)
9. the vacancy rate (V = 0.032 ∗ F) (1 equation)
The set of unknowns includes:
1. the number of individuals unemployed with i months of benefits (10 unknowns)
2. the values of being in each state, VA, VU(i), VE(t, i) (108 unknowns)
3. the re-employment probabilities,m(i) (11 unknowns)
4. the search intensities, p(i) (11 unknowns)
5. the average number of applications filed by workers at each firm λ (1 unknown)
6. the number employed, E (1 unknown)
7. the number on IA, A (1 unknown)
8. the number of firms, F (1 unknown)
9. the number of vacancies, V (1 unknown)
Solving themodel for the program group entails solving the additional set of 72 equations:
1. the value functions for being employed and receiving the SSP top up (36 equations)
2. the value functions for being on IA and treated with the SSP offer (12 equations)
3. the re-employment probabilities when on IA with the SSP offer (12 equations)
4. the first order conditions for search effort when on IA with the SSP offer (12
equations),
and 72 unknowns:
1. the value of being employed and receiving the SSP top up (36 unknowns)
2. the value of being on IA and treated with the SSP offer (12 unknowns)
3. the re-employment probabilities (12 unknowns)
4. optimal search effort (12 unknowns).
The model has no closed form solution. To see how we solve the model, define a 145 × 1
vector for the unknowns, x, and a system of non-linear equations, f (x). We solve this
system of equations in two steps. We obtain starting values by solving
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x = argmin f (x)′f (x)
using aQuasi-Newtonmethod, where the Hessian is updated using the Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) update. Second, using the above starting values, we solve the
system of non-linear equations using the secant method (Broyden’s approximation to
Jacobian).45 The solution to the model directly yields the simulated version of the model.
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